Fortunately for the North Korean people, several developments staved off further famine as North Korea entered the 21st century.

• North Korea formally requested humanitarian aid from the international community, and the international community responded in kind. It is estimated that at least 25% of North Korea’s food needs are provided from outside the country.
• South Korea under the Sunshine Policy began to provide North Korea with fertilizer aid, which greatly assisted internal food growth.
• Perhaps most importantly, informal markets have sprung up in North Korean communities, providing the North Korean people an alternative source of food other than the central food distribution system.

However, recent developments have turned this early optimistic analysis upside down.

• In August 2007, severe floods occurred across North Korea, causing extensive damage. Approximately ten percent of North Korea’s arable land was estimated to have been destroyed, as well as hundreds of thousands of buildings. There are reports that areas around Pyongyang have finally recovered from this flood, but the crucial northern areas that were stricken in the previous famine have yet to be addressed. The full impact of the floods on North Korean food production remains to be seen; however scholars note that hunger-related deaths are now re-appearing in these northern areas.
• With the election of a more conservative government in South Korea, relations between North Korea and South Korea have deteriorated. South Korea has discontinued its fertilizer shipments to its northern neighbour and been more critical vis-à-vis North Korea. In retaliation, North Korea has shut down the DMZ and North Korea-related tourism in the venture regions of Kaesong and the Kumkang Mountains. As with anything regarding North Korea, Pyongyang’s motives behind the shutdown remain unclear: yet the more North Korea isolates itself from South Korea and the rest of the world, the more likely another famine-like situation will occur.
• Despite food shortages relating to the August 2007 floods, a repetition of the previous famine has been unlikely due to the existence of informal markets. However, Pyongyang has since 2005 been cracking down on these markets and forcing citizens to rely upon the central food distribution system. If another famine were to occur and such markets unavailable to North Koreans for food, it is likely that large scale famine-related deaths will re-occur.
• Finally, the health of Kim Jong Il is itself in question. ROK intelligence confirms that Kim suffered a stroke and is being consulted by foreign doctors. As the central figure in North Korea hierarchy, if Kim were to die it is uncertain whether a clear successor would emerge in Pyongyang. If such uncertainty led to internal chaos within North Korea, the central food distribution would most likely collapse and lead to severe food shortages and possible famine. Even without famine, internal chaos within North Korea could lead to the massive displacement along both borders that North Korea shares with its neighbours. China already seems to be concerned: on top of the various security fences and CCTV cameras installed along the North Korea-PRC border, Beijing has redeployed anywhere between 100,000 to 200,000 soldiers to augment its presence in this region.

As all these variables are not unlikely scenarios, the threat of famine that has already ravaged North Korea in the 1990’s is still a looming threat to the North Korean people. No doubt famine will exacerbate an already pressing refugee crisis. Yet China has now augmented its security along the shared border and deployed extra troops to interdict potential refugee traffic that may arise with North Korean internal instability. If the current policy of repatriation continues, these refugees will not only be sent to a fate of certain imprisonment, torture, and even execution, but also to a state of famine and chaos.